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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * * * * *
)
)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
)
)
-vs)
)
)
S. TONY COX, Director,
Drivers License Division,
)
Department of Public Safety,
)
State of Utah,
)
)
Defendant and Respondent. )
TALLIE LEE CAVANESS,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
ON APPEAL
Case No. 15801

* * * * * * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a trial de nova hearing in Third
District Court from a finding of the Utah Department of Public
Safety, Driver's License Division Hearing that the Appellant
refused to submit to a chemical test under Utah's implied consent
statute.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judge Jay Banks of the Third District Court found that
the requirements of Utah's implied consent law had been met, and
that the Appellant had wrongfully refused a chemical test pursuant
thereto and revoked Appelant's Driver's License for one year.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests this court to affirm the Trial
Court's decision and to declare Subsection (g) of Utah Code
Annotated, 41-6-44.10

(1953)

as amended, to be constitutional,

if, and to what extent, this court considers that issue.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent would make this court aware of essential
dispositive facts that were not emphasized by the Appellant.
The chronology of the events in the transcript is that
rather than being stopped for a 'l:ninor- driving offense," he was
stopped for exhibition driving and there was apparently some
argument as to that.

Besides the odor of alcohol, slurred

speech, hand coordination problems and the admission of
drinking, the appellant refused the field sobriety tests.

(R·j

Subsequently, the officer found a half open mini bottle in
Respondent's coat pocket.

(R-94).

The arresting officer was

also threatened with a false imprisonment suite,

(R-99), before

the breathalyzer test was requested and in the presence of a
back-up officer (R-94), who had arrived approximately 10
minutes later or at least after the officer waited 10 minutes
for a wants and warrants check.

During this time, Mr. cavanesi

got out of the car three times while he was under arrest,

(R-~f

which testimony was substantiated by the officer, the back~up
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may-2contain errors.

officer (R-87), and also by the Respondent.

(R-120).

The

Respondent on subsequent testimony denied that he ever got out
of the car.

(R-124).

Although the Petitioner testified to

the contrary, the arresting officer testified that he requested
an attorney only 45 minutes later at the jail.

(R-101).

The back-up officer substantiated the arresting officer's
testimony that the first refusal was "in the negative," (R-84),
and that the implied consent statute was read and a similar
request made (R-85).

The arresting officer's testimony was that

"he said no he wouldn't take the breathalyzer,"

(R-95), but that

he did request to have an attorney present at the jail which was
admitted and substantiated by the testimony of the Plaintiff when
he admitted under oath that he had refused and wouldn't take the
test "unless his attorney was present."

(R-117).

This was

subsequent, and at the jail and the officer explained that 'he
could call his attorney after he had taken the breathalyzer test."
(R-101).

The consequences of his refusal were explained to him,

(R-96, 97), and he was allowed to read the implied consent card
himself,

(R-84, 85), which testimony was corroborated by the

Plaintiff himself when he admitted that we was allowed to read
the implied consent card and law,
been read to him.

(R~ll8),

which had previously

(R-97).

The Respondent testified that he was in his last
semester of law school at the time,

(R-116, 96), and had taken
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criminal law,

(R-117),

had "an exact knowledge of the law,"

(R-124), and had gone into the implied consent law in those
classes.

(R-119).
He also admitted under oath that the real reason he

refused was that he was angry at the officers,
he felt that his rights had been violated.

(R-123), and

(R-125).

POINT I
THE UTAH IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE IS CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE
The Utah implied consent law, Utah Code Annotated
41-6-44.10,

(1953) as amended, is obviously a civil statute

as declared by other courts with respect to similar statutes
as the only remedy provided for there is a public safety
remedy or the revocation of a "license or permit to drive."
There are no other remedies provided under that act.

The Utah

Operator and Chauffeurs License Act, Utah Code Annotated
41-2-1 (o), defines the word license as a privilege to aper~
a motor vehicle over the highways of this state.

A license

certificate is also defined as evidence of "the privilege"
The purpose of that act is obviously for the safety of the
traveling public and to identify individuals who have "a disre;
for the safety of other persons on the highways."

See Utah

Code Annotated 41-2-19 (6).
The United State Supreme Court in the case of ~
41Law
U.S.
on provided
May 16,
1977,of Museum
in holding
the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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Illinois statute allowing the suspension of a driving privilege
without a preliminary hearing was adequate under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, also stated that the nature of the private interest was
not so great as to require a departure from "the ordinary
principle . .

that something less than an evidentiary hearing

is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action," and cited
the case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319.

This case

involved a commercially licensed truck driver, and the court
stated that the risks of a depravation of an individual's rights
as opposed to the paramount public interest, did not deny the
Appellant due process.

Esentially that is the argument of this

Appellant, i.e. that his right to due process was denied as he
was denied the right to counsel.
This has been the holding of all of the courts that have
ruled on this question.

For example, the court in Fritts v. The

Department of Motor Vehicles, 6 Wash. App. 233, 492 P.2d 558, 1971,
stated that, "regardless of whether driving is a right or a
privilege, the license revocation proceeding is not a criminal
proceeding"

"the fact that in the criminal proceeding that

the driver was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have been
driving while intoxicated has no bearing on civil proceedings
under 'cite omited' to revoke his drivers license for refusal to
submit to a chemical test of his breath.
tions in accord."

We find other jurisdic-

The cases all explain that implied consent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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proceedings are not criminal because there are no criminal
penalties or dangers and because the public safety dangers
out weigh the dangers to the loss of an individual's rights.
They unanimously hold that criminal safeguards are not
applicable to driving privilege revocation proceedings und~
implied consent laws because they have a subsequent right to
hearing and a trial de novo along with the right to cross
examine the individuals taking the test and the basis for
the test scientifically and also, as in the case of the Utah
implied consent statute, a right to have their own scentific
test taken contemporaneously with the. test requested by the
officer.

See Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44 .10 (f) as amended.

Many of these cases are cited subsequently and we have found
such holdings in the states of Arizona, Washington, California
Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Ore
South Dakota, Hawaii, North Dakota along with. i t being impliei
by this Court in the State of Utah.

Wherein all of these cas:

simply say, what the statute does , that is that the only
remedy provided is a revocation civil driving privilege.
POINT II
A DRIVER UNDER THE UTAH IMPLIED CONSENT LAW HAS
NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY
OR TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY PRESENT BEFORE DECIDING TO
SUBMIT OR NOT

-6-
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Many courts have considered the question of whether or
not a driver asked to take a chemical test under implied consent
laws has a constitutional right to consult with counsel or to have
counsel present before saying yes or no

to the test.

The

consensus with respect to implied consent proceedings, among
state supreme courts, is that such a constitutional right does
not exist under either the United States Constitution or state
constitutions.

Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W. 2d 291 (N.D. 1974); Blow

v. Commissioner, 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W. 2d 351 (1969); Campbell
v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P. 2d 685 (1971); Coleman
v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 684, 187 N.E. 2d 172 (1972); Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Cannon, 4 Pa. cmwlth. 119,
286 A. 2d 24 (1972); Calvert v. State, 519 P. 2d 341 (Colo. 1974);
Harrison v. State, Department of Public Safety, 298 So. 2d 312
(La. App. 1974); Mills v. Bridges, 93 Id. 679, 471 P. 2d 66 (1970);
Robertson v. State, 501 P. 2d 1099 (Okla. 1972); Siegwald v.
Curry, 319 N.E. 2d 381 (Ohio 1974); Spradling v. Deimeke, 528 S.W.
2d 759 (Mo. 1975); State v. Dellveneri, 258 A. 2d 834 (Vt. 1969);
State v. Kenderski, 99 N.J. Super. 224, 239 A. 2d 249 (1969);
State v. Petkus, 269 A. 2d 123 (N.H. 1970); State v. Severino,
537 P. 2d 1187 (Haw.

1975); State v. Stevens, 252 A. 2d 58

(Me. 1969); State v. Trotter, 4 Conn. Cir. 185, 230 A. 2d 618
(1967); Stratikos v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 4. Or. App.
313, 477 P. 2d 237 (1970); Swenumson v. Iowa Department of
Public Safety, 210 N.W. 2d 660 (Iowa 1973); Wiseman v. Sullivan,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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190 Neb. 724, 211 N.W. 2d 906
Ct. App.,

74 Cal. Rptr.

(1973); Westmoreland v. Chapm
--:...::....:..::..::.-=..:::.=..::::.-.::..:__~_::p

an,

363 (1968).

The foregoing cases represent 21 different jurisdictlc
and are mostly state supreme court decisions.

Two United

States Supreme Court cases, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966) and U.S. v. Wade,

388 U.W. 218 (1967), to be discu'

later, are in agreement.
The most often cited reason why no constitutional

rigl

to counsel exists is that implied consent proceedings are civi
and administrative in nature and not criminal in nature havino
no criminal penalties and involve safety of the public.

As

this Court knows, the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution providing that, "In all criminal prosecutions, tr
accused shall enjoy the right • .

. to have the assistance of

counsel for his defense," is applied by the courts only
to criminal prosecutions.

They also have denied its applicabl

to civil implied consent proceedings.
The judges in Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 171
S.E. 2d 199 (1969}, held, along with others that, Virgina's
implied consent proceedings to be civil and administrative in
nature.

They said:
An accused who refuses a blood test is not
required to post bond for his appearance, and he , .
does not have to give bail or enter into a reco~n1zani
He is under no legal duty to appear at the hearing
if he does not desire to introduce evidence of the
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basis and reasonableness of his refusal to take a
test, or for his failure to appear at a hearing.
In fact, there is nothing about the entire proceeding
that parallels the Procedure in criminal prosecution.
(Emphasis added.)
For other cases on point holding implied consent
proceedings to be civil in nature and not criminal, see Agnew,
Calvert, Campbell, Mills, State of Hawaii, Stratikos, Swenumson,
all supra, and Ziemba v. Johns, 163 N.W. 2d 780 (Neb. 1969).
These cases specifically hold that the right to counsel, does not
attach to implied consent proceedings.
Subsection (h) of Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44.10 (1953),
as amended, provides "

. evidence of refusal shall be

admissible in any civil or criminal action • . • "

Appellant

argues that since "refusal evidence" is admissible in a criminal
prosecution, that the right to counsel should attach when the
driver is asked to take a chemical test.

Other jurisdictions

(and two U.S. Supreme Court cases) have given some decisive
reasons why this verbage of the statute is not decisive.
It should be noted at this point that the constitutional
question of right to counsel in a criminal case, where evidence
of refusal or the results of a chemical test are at issue, is not
before this Court.

The only fact tried below was a refusal

involving a driving privilege.

Appellant should, therefore, have

no standing to raise this question since this case is a civil
trial de novo and administrative only.
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However, if the Court does wish to consider this
question, there is substantial authority on the constitutiona.
right to counsel before taking a chemical test under the
implied consent law even where the proceeding before the Cour:
is a criminal prosecution.
In Schmerber, supra, the United States Supreme court
upheld a California drivers criminal conviction for driving
while intoxicated.

A blood alcohol test was taken over the

motorist's "counsel-based" objection.

The court held that

the convicted motorist was not entitled to assert the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel for the reasons that he had no rigi
to refuse the test and "no issue of counsel's ability toassi;
petitioner in respect of any rights he did possess is present;
The court said that the test involved no testimonial or communicative evidence so the driver was not entitled to assert
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incimination.
The court also held that due process was complied wit:
and that the taking of the test did not con~ti tute an unconst:
tutional search and seizure.
In People v. Sudduth, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393, 421 P. 2d 4~:
(1966), they affirmed a driving under the influence criminal
conviction.

The California Supreme Court, in bank, held that

Suspects have no constitutional right to
refuse a test designed to produce physical evid~~
in the form of a breath sample (cites omitted) wheth<
or not counsel is present (cite omitted.)
We note that the physical and psychologi~a~
disturbance
the provided
indivdual
involved
obtaining
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law
Library. Funding forof
digitization
by the Institute
of Museum in
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a breath sample is apt to be significantly less than
that involved in extracting a blood sample, an
evidence gathering technique recently approved in
Schmerber v. State of California (1966) 384 U.S. 757,
86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 208, and that the blood
alcohol test and the breath test for alcoholic
absorption are alternate means for determining the
percentage of alcohol in the blood. The value of
such objective scientific data of intoxication
to supplement the fallible symptomatic of intoxication
cannot be disputed. (People v. Duroncelay (1957) 48
Cal. 2d 766, 772, 312 P. 2d 690.)
In a day when
excessive loss of life and and property is caused
by inebriated drivers, an imperative need exists for
a fair, efficient, and accurate system of detection,
enforcement and, hence prevention.
(Cite omitted,
Emphasis added.)
California and U.

s.

law is well settled that a driver

confronted with a chemical test has no constitutional right
to consult with counsel or to have counsel present whether the
proceeding in question is civil under California's implied
consent law, or even a criminal prosecution.

The reasons are

that the motorist has no legal right to refuse the test or to
assert other privileges such as the Fifth Amendment.

Schrnerber,

Sudduth, Westmoreland, all supra and Ent v. State, Ct. App.,
71 Cal. Rptr. 726

(1968).

The Arizona Supreme Court in Campbell, supra, denied
any constitutional right to counsel under its implied consent
law after holding that a chemical test confrontation under the
implied consent law was not a "critical stage" requiring
assistanct of counsel.

The court considered the principles

expoused in Schmerber and Wade,

(both supra), to be controlling

saying:
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The United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926,
18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967) held that an accused
ha~ ~ right to the assistance of counsel at any
critical state of the prosecution.
In Wade the
Court found that a post-indictment lineup was
such a critical stage. The following passage
from Wade, however makes it evident that under
the rationale of that decision respondent was
not entitled to counsel prior to deciding whether
or not to submit to the breathalyzer test:
"The Government characterizes the
lineup as a mere preparatory step in the
gathering of the prosecution's evidence
not different--for Sixth Amendment purposes-from various other preparatory steps, such
as systemztized or scientific analyzing of
the accused's fingerprints, blood sample,
clothing, hair, and the like. We think
there are differences which preclude
such stages being charac.terized as critical
stages at which the accused has the right
to the presence of his counsel.
Knowledge
of the techniques of science and technology
is sufficiently available, and the variables
in techniques few enough, that the accused
has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Government's case at trial
through the ordinary process of crossexamina tion of the Government's expert
witnesses and the presentation of the
evidence of his own experts. The denial
of a right to have his counsel present at
such analyses does not therefore violate the
Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages
since there is minimal risk that his counsel's
absence at such states might derogate from
his right to a fair trial."
388 U. S. at
pages 227 228, 87 s. ct.at pages 1932-1933.
As previously noted, under Arizona's Implied Consent
Law a person does not have a right to refuse to
submit to a chemical test only the physical power;
therefore, as in Schmerber, there is no issue of
counsel's ability to assist respondent in respeE!_
of any rights he did possess. It is the opinion
of this court that respondent was not entitled to
the assistance of counsel in deciding whether or
not to submit to the breathalyzer test.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
(Cites omitted, Emphasis added.)
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see also State v. Kenderski and State v. Trotter. both supra,
where criminal convictions were affirmed after the courts held
there was no constitutional right to counsel with respect to
chemical tests requested.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Petkus,
supra, in affirming a driving under the influence conviction,
held that the taking of a blood test under its implied consent
law was not a critical stage of the prosecution.

The driver

was not allowed upon request to talk with his attorney prior to
his taking the test.
suppressed.

They moved to have the test results

The court stated:

We hold that the decisions to be made by
an accused under our implied consent law are not
essentially "a lawyer's decision, (cite omitted),
but, on the contrary, can be made by a defendant
in the absence of the assistance of counsel without
any substantial prejudice to his rights under the
Sixth Amendment.
(Cites omitted.)
In other words we hold that the taking of
defendant's blood under the implied consent law
(cite omitted), was not a "critical" stage of the
crminal proceeding requiring the assistance of
counsel "to preserve the defendant's basic right
to a fair trial." Coleman v. Alabama, supra. The
Trail Court properly ruled that the results of the
test of defendant's blood were admissible in evidence
at the trial.
The courts stress that under the implied consent law a
motorist has no right to refuse a test but only the physical
power.

See, for example, Campbell, Kenderski, Schmerber and

Sudduth, all supra, and State v. Miller, 185 S.E. 2d 239
(s.c. 1971).

The Utah implied consent law by its clear
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All vehicle operators are deemed as a matter of law
to have previously consented to a chemical test.

(Hence the

name of the statute) . Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44 .10 (a)

provides in part, "Any person operating a motor vehicle in th'.
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical
test or test of his breath, blood, or urine .

Utah

drivers also sign a contract agreeing to the test when applyir
for their permit to drive.

(See the attachedexhibit "A".) Ther

fore, Utah drivers as in other states, have no "right" to refc
but certainly the physical power.

The cases explain that the

reason a motorist's physical "refusal" or recision of prior
consent is allowed.

It avoids violence and physical coercion.

(Very good public policy consering the circumstances surroundi·
these types of cases generally.)
Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44 .10 (b),

(1953) as arnendec

provides:
If such person has been placed under arrest and
has thereafter been requested by a peace officer to
submit to any one or more of the chemical tests
provided for in subsection (a) of this section and
refuses to submit to such chemical test or tests,
such person shall be warned by a peace officer
requesting the test or tests that a :efusal to.submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of
his license to operate a motor vehicle.
Language similar to this has been construed by many courts
not to give motorists the "right" to refuse.

Campbell, supra,

at 692 states:
In Arizona
(cite omitted), provides that
"[I]f a person ~nder arrest refuses to submit to
a chemical
designated
theof Museum
law enfor~ement
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agency as provided in subsection A, none shall be
given."
This language does not give a person a
"right" to refuse to submit to the test only the
physical power. We agree with the court in (cite
omitted) that the "obvious reason for acquiescence
in the refusal of such a test by a person who as
a matter of law is 'deemed to have given his consent'
is to avoid the violence which would often attend
forcible tests upon recalcitrant inebriates."
(Cite omitted.)
It is the opinion of this court that since a
person does not have a right to refuse to submit
to the test and because the refusal itself is
not "testimonial communication" that comment upon
such refusal is not improper.
(Emphasis added.)
The court in Campbell, in footnote 6 at 692, went even
further in advancing public safety and explained that a wrongful
refusal to submit was the same type of evidence as the test
results (non-testimonial) and just as the test results are not
subject to the Fifth Amendment, neither is evidence of refusal.
The California Supreme Court in Sudduth, supra, held that
comment on refusal in a criminal case was constitutionally
permissible and that the Fifth Amendment did not apply.

Then

the Court explained any different results in other jurisdictions
with respect to the admissibility of refusal evidence in a
criminal case can be ascribed to:
. an underlying constitutional or statutory
right to refuse to produce the physical evidence
sought.
States that recognize a right to refuse to
take such tests exclude evidence of a refusal. States
that recognize no right to refuse allow testimony and
comment on the refusal.
(Emphasis added.)
Utah now obviously falls in the latter category.

Our

Implied
Statute
does fornot
give
motorists
the
"right"
to Services
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refuse and expressly allows refusal evidence in criminal
proceedings.

Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44 .10

(h)

(1953)

as amended.
Appellant cites three prior Utah cases to support his
argument that he had a "right" to refuse.
23 U. 2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877

Hunter v. Darius,

(1969), Moran v. Shaw, 580 P. 2d

241 {Ut. 1978) and Peterson v. Darius, 547 P. 2d 693 (Ut. 197!
These cases simply addressed the questions of whether or not
the refusal was reasonable and whether or not there was a
refusal at all.
refuse.

This Court has never recognized a

"right"~

In State v. Miokovich, 185 S_.E. 2d 360 {S.C. 1971) tt

South Carolina Supreme Court held that comment on refusal ina
criminal trial was constitutionally permissible and furthfil
construed that the State's implied consent law (similar to
Utah's) to clearly not give a motorist the "right" to refuse.
An example of a

jurisdiction in the former category,

where the statutory right to refuse exists and, therefore,
the refusal is not admissible into evidence is, State v.
Stevens, 252 A. 2d 58

(Me. 1969).

The court noted that

Maine's law expressly gives the motorist the right to refuse.
It provides that a test can only be given upon the consent of
the motorist.

Consent is not implied by that statute.

The

officer simply asks the motorist if he would like a chemical
test and explains the legal ramifications.

Our Legislature as

in other jurisdictions, as indicated above, clearly intended
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just

th~

opposite policy.

The authorities cited in Appellant's

brief are distinguishable.
Appellant cites Siegwald, supra, and State v. Welch,
376 A. 2d 834 (Vt. 1977) claiming that the right to counsel was
extended in those cases for the reason that refusal evidence
was admissible in criminal proceedings.

The Siegwald, statute

extended a statutory right to counsel while Welch extended a
limited right to counsel only after concluding that the
motorist had a "right" to refuse.

Welch also involved a

serious criminal automobilB homocide case.

People v. Gursey,

N.Y. Ct. of App., 239 N.E. 2d 351 (19?8) extended a limited right
to counsel but was also a criminal case recognizing the
motorist's right to refuse.
Appellant cites Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285,
170 S.E. 2d 199 (1969), State v. Dellveneri, supra and Stratikos,
supra, claiming that the denial of counsel in those cases is
based partly on the fact that refusal evidence is not admissible
in criminal proceedings.

The holdings are not that broad.

Those courts did not discuss "refusal

evidenc~"

or the

ramifications on the right to counsel issue, if such evidence
was allowed.

The courts simply declared the proceedings to be

civil and held that no constitutional right to counsel attached
for that reason.

The court in Stratikos stated it did not even

see the need for a "critical stage" inquiry since the proceeding
was not criminal in nature.
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Appellant states in his brief at P. 4 that

~

388 U.S. 218 (1967), a robbery case, stands for the propositio
that:
. an accused does not have to stand alone
against state prosecution at any stage of criminal
prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out of
court, if the absence of counsel might infringe
upon his right to a fair trial.
Appellant cannot ignore the court's discussion and reasoning c
scientific evidence and physical gathering techniques cited
above.
The Government characterizes the lineup as a
mere preparatory step in the gathering of the
prosecution's evidence, not different--for Sixth
Amendment purposes--from various other preparatory
steps, such as systematized or scientific analyzing
of the accused fingerprints, blood sample, clothing,
hair,
and the like. We think there are differences
which preclude such stages being characterized as
critical stages at which the accused has the right
to the presence of his counsel.
Knowledge of the
techniques of science and technology is sufficiently
available, and the variables in techniques few
enough, that the accused has the opportunity for a
meaningful confrontation of the Government's case
at trial through the ordinary processes of crossexamination of the Government's expert witnesses
and the presentation of the evidence of his own
experts.
The denial or a right to have his counsel
present at such analyses does not therefore violate
the Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages
since there is minimal risk that his counsel's
absence at such stages might derogate from his
right to a fair trial.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) simply held
that the right to counsel was guaranteed at the point where t'
accused, prior to arraignment, was subjected to secret interr':
gation despite repeated requests to see his lawyer.

(Not our
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facts here).

Escobedo also dealt with crucial criminal evidence

subject to the Fifth Amendment.

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.

(1972) is likewise inapplicable to the facts of this civil

682

case.
Article I, Sections 11 and 12 of the Utah Constitution
relied on by the Appellant provide free access to the courts.
Section 12 providing that "the accused shall not be compelled
to give evidence against himself" is duplicative of the
United States Consitution's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and should be interpreted no broader than
its federal counterpart.

Our statute grants free access, trial

de novo and appeal.
Respondent has cited cases from 21 jurisdictions holding
that a drunk driver has no constitutional right to consult with
counsel or to have counsel present before deciding whether or
not to take a chemical test under similar implied consent
laws.

These cases all say that miranda rights and criminal

safeguards do not attach, and our statute imposes no criminal
penalties.

With respect to implied consent proceedings, Respondent

could find no authority granting a constitutional right to
counsel although a minority has extended a limited statutory
right.

Our Legislature has expressly stated that such a right

does not exist and there are no legal or logical reasons to overturn that policy.
(g)

Specifically, Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44.10

(1953) as amended.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
In conclusion,
this Act,
Honorable
Court
decide to
Library Services andif
Technology
administered by
the Utahdoes
State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19-

consider the question of constitutional rather th an statutory
right to counsel before a chemical test in the criminal
context, Respondent has cited substantial authority.

rt ster

from two United States Supreme Court case, Schmerber an d

~·

both supra, and seems to be persuasive.
POINT III
THERE EXPRESSLY IS NO STATUTORY RIGHT TO CONSULT
WITH COUNSEL OR TO HAVE COUNSEL PRESENT FOR A
REQUESTED CHEMICAL TEST UNDER THE UTAH IMPLIED
CONSENT STATUTE
The Utah Legislature has expressly declared that "for
the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical te:
or tests, the person to be tested shall not have the

right~

consult an attorney nor shall such a person be permitted to h;
an attorney .

.

. present as a condition for the taking of an1

test." Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44.10 {g)

(1953) as amended.

As discussed under Point I, subsection {g) does not
violate the Utah or the United States Constitutions.

The

policy reasons why the legislature chose not to grant a
statutory right to counsel under the implied consent drivers
licensing statute are obvious and compelling!

Even one maimir

1

or death on the highways caused by drinking drivers is sorr 0>
for family and friends and a drain on society--let alone what
statistics show statewide.
It is common scientific knowledge that alcohol

•

the

in

spreads
and quickly
dissipates
time.
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Therefore, the public interest demands that a driver suspected
of driving under the influence of intoxicants be given his

I
chance for a chemical test swiftly.

Any and all maneuvering

and stalling on the part of the drinking driver must be avoided.
The innocent public's rights are obvious, prevailing and should
tip the scales of justice and decency.

The court in State v.

Pandoli, N.J. Super., 262 A. 2d 41 (1970) very aptly said it:
In any event, the request for consultation
with counsel necessarily involved a delay in administration of the test. Having in mind the remedial
purpose of the statute, and the rapidity with which
the passage of time and the physiologicil processes
tend to eliminate evidence of ingested alcohol in
the system, it is sensible to construe the statute
to mean that anything substantially short of an unqualified, unequivocal assent to an officer's request
that the arrested motorist take the test constitutes a refual to do so.
(Cite omitted.)
The
occasion is not one for debate, maneuver or~
negotiation, but rather for a simple "yes" or
"no" to the officer's request. (Emphasis added.)
Before enactment of the 1977 amendments to the Utah
implied consent law,many implied consent cases involved
extensive factual inquiries into innumerable issues surrounding
the drivers request to consult with counsel.

For example; Was

the request reasonable, made solely for delay, would late phone
calls unduly hamper the test, how much time should be given,
and under what circumstances, etc.
the Courts cited above) clearly
in one decisive swoop.

Well, our Legislature (and

answered all of these issues

These difficult fact questions, the con-

tinual attempts to delay the test and the grave public interest
certainly
provide
justification
the
Legislature's
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express denial of a statutory right to counsel in the

mat~r

the drivers license.
Some jurisdictions have extended motorists a limited
right to counsel based upon statute, rule or police

proc~mr

and some of these jurisdictions solely extend this right when
criminal prosecution is at issue.

If there were a conflictir

Utah statute, regulation or rule extending to an arrested
driver a blanket right to consult with counsel about a test
or drivers license, subsection (g), supra, expresses the most
recent intent of the Utah Legislature and should be supreme.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT APPELLANT REFUSED
AND TRIED TO DELAY THE BREATHALYZER TEST IS
SUPPORTED BY FACT AND SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED
The statute under which this case was tried specificai.
provides that no right to counsel exists and that the driver
has no right to condition the test upon the presence of an
attorney or anyone else.

Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44.10 (gl

(1953) as amended.
This Court has never stated that a refusal must ~
unconditional under any circumstances, nor have the Courts fro·
other jurisdictions.

It is clear that the unreasonable

conditioning a chemical test upon the right to counsel or any
other delay tactic, when no such right exists, constitutes a
refusal.

The court in Spradling, supra, defines refusal as
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There is no mysterious meaning to the word
"refusal".
In the context of the implied consent
law, it simply means that an arrestee, after having
been requested to take the breathalyzer test, declines
to do so of his own volition. Whether the declination
is accomplished by verbally saying, "I refuse", or
by remaining silent and just not breathing or
blowing into the machine, or by vocalizing some
sort of qualified or conditional consent or
refusal, does not make any difference.
The
volitional failure to do what is necessary in
order that the test can be performed is a refusal.
(Emphasis added.)
Mills, supra, also states:
It has been quite uniformly held by the courts
which have considered the issue that a qualified or
conditional refusal to take a test to determine the
level of blood alcohol is a refusal within the meaning
of statutes similar to ours . . A defendant cannot condition his consent of the test upon the presence of
counsel.
(Cites omitted, Emphasis added.)
See also Coleman, Commonwealth v. Cannon, State v. Pandoli,
Swenumson, Westmoreland and Wiseman, all supra.

Based upon

Utah law, the trial court properly found that Appellant's
refual to take the breathalyzer test until he contacted his
attorney definitely was a refusal upon the law and the facts, and
shouldn't be overturned.
Appellant cites some case law to support his contention
that he was sincerely confused concerning his right to counsel
and, therefore, his

(admitted) refusal was reasonable.

Appellant did not tell the officer that he was confused about
his rights or ask for a further explanation.

He simply

refused to take a test without his attorney being present and
(R-101,
was told
heQuinney
could
his attorney
afterby the
test.
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-The cases seem to say that it is incumbent upon the off'icer
clear up any confusion concerning "rights" only when confus;
is objectively manifested, which was not found by this Trial
Judge.
Although Appellant (a law student) claims he was

confused about his right, the Trial Judge who heard and saw 1

witnesses specifically found that Appellant "had a chip on hi
shoulder clear up to his eyebrows.
test.

He wasn't about to

ta~

He had a little smattering of law and thought he kne'

everything.

There's no question about that in my mind."

(R-41, 130).

The Trial Judge also found that Appellant's

request for counsel was delayed and interposed for delay of
the test.

(R-40, 131).

The evidence brought out at trial is
the trial judge's findings of fact.

sufficient~~

It is a well establishe1

principle that the trial court's findings of fact should not
be reversed on appeal "unless he clearly does violence ~
the facts as they relate to his findings."

Gassman, supra.

The above principle is especially important in this 1
since much of the testimony at trial was contradictory.
See for example the Trial Record at 12 3.

See also the Trial

Record at 99 and 127 where the officer testified Appellant g:

out of his car three times while waiting for the officer. N
R-126, Appellant testified that he absolutely did not, durini
this same time, ever get out of his car.
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POINT V
THERE IS NO STATUTORY LIMITED RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN ORDER TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TAKE A CHEMICAL
TEST TO DETERMINE THE ALCOHOLIC CONTENT OF ONES
BLOOD IN THE STATE OF UTAH
The Appellant argues that it is a critical stage of the
criminal proceedings.

As pointed out previously, the implied

consent statute only involves a driving privilege, is a solely
civil and administrative proceeding, and therefore; the burden
of proof in the criminal trial and its accompanying penalties
and rights are not applicable.

Even if they were, the United

States Supreme Court in the Wade, supra, specifically pointed
out that the taking of blood was not a critical stage in the
proceedings nor was it testimonial evidence requiring all of
the criminal protections of the Fifth Amendment and due process.
This decision was upheld in May, 1977 in the Dixon v. Love,
supra.

The Appellant cites the language of Kirby v. Illinois,

surpa, which reiterates the supreme court's decision stating
that there is no substantial prejudice to the individual's
rights because he has a right to cross-examining, confront the
test and witnesses in a subsequent trial de novo.

Of course,

that right is granted by the Utah implied consent statute.
Appellant cites Peterson and Hunter, both supra, Gassman
v. Dorius, 543 P. 2d 197 (Utah 1975) and Gooch v. Spradling,
523 S.W. 2d 861

(Mo. 1975) arguing that. any refusal or with-

drawal of prior consent must be unequivocal.

These cases all
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involved a limited right to counsel within reason and dealt
with the motorist's attempts to contact counsel agreed to
by the officers.

Each case applied reason under the facts~

particular circumstances.
The legislature realized the driver's

opportuni~~

delay tactics under the former law and shifted the focus
away from those fact inquiries into the "reasonableness" of
a refusal to the simpler question of:

Was there a refusal?

This intent was expressed by the 1977 amendment's deletion oi
"without reasonable cause" from the former law.
If at said hearing the department determines
that the person was granted the right to submit
to a chemical test and without reasonable cause)
refused to submit to such test, or if such person
fails to appear before the department as required
in the notice, the department shall revoke for one
year his license or permit to drive.
(Deleted
language underlined.)
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.10,
(1953), as amended.
The 1977 Legislature also deleted the words "without
reason" from the last sentence of sub-paragraph (a) of

t~

above quoted statute, substituting the words "a peace officer'
for arresting officer.

Therefore, it was the apparent intent

of the legislature as shown by specifically deleting the words
"within reason" and "without reasonable cause" to not only all
the officer choice of tests, but require the individual total
that test without any limited right to counsel.
Such expressions of intent by the legislature have
· of
often been upheld by this Court, it has long been a maxim
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statutor~

construction that where a express provision of a

statute is deleted (especially a whole paragraph) there is
a presumption that there was a
intended.

specific change in the law

That is what this Court said in the case of Allen v.

Board of Education of Weber County, 120 Utah 556, 236 P. 2d
756, 763 (1951), and in other cases:
. It is clear that when express powers are
conferred upon such a governing body and by subsequent
amendment a section of the enactment which conferred
a specific power is repealed, there is manifest a
legislative intent to withdraw the specific power
(Emphasis added.)
Such is the law of other states such as California
as accentuated in the case of Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 31 Ca. Rptr. 477, 382 P. 2d 597 (1963).
The Appellant argues that he should have had a limited
right to counsel because his refusal was not unequivocal.
Such is not supported by the facts as found by the trial judge.
The facts show that it was unequivocal the first time and the
second time conditioned on an attorney being present.

Since

consent to the test is implied by the statute and also specifically contracted for and agreed to by the individual when he
applies for his license (See exhibit "A"), we urge this Court
to hold that there is even less of a burden upon the drivers
license division to show any kind of refusal at all.

If there

is any right to counsel implied, it would have to be based on
the reasonableness of the situation and the facts of the case.
This in essence puts the arresting officer on trial, which is
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surely not the intent of the statute.

If unreasonablcnc:ss

0

,

reasonableness becomes an element, it should surely be in
the nature of an affirmative defense that should be plead

a~

proved by the driver who has previously consented to the
taking of the chemical test.
CONCLUSION
The only conclusion that this Court can draw is that
the Trial Court was right in its decision that the amended
statute gives no statutory right to counsel, and that there
a specific, unconditional refusal.

w;

Also that, there was no

constitutional right to counsel, and even if there were, the
request was made solely for purposes of delay, as found by the
Trial Judge.
DATED this

day of November, 1978.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN

~ral ~

®CmALE~

Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
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CJ Cl

S.

DO YOU HAYE AHIST'ORYOFEPfLEPSY',SErzURES.MBMTALClO~
CO!'IYt."LSJOfrlS.. •sU.CKOUTS·. 01zzy snu.s. ETC.t

c::J D

I.

HAVE YOU HAD HEAllT TROUBl..L DIABBT~ PAR.ALY3... 011 All1'
OTHC:R PHYSICAL HA... DlCAP OR DISABIUT1' lQTHWR TRAM Vl9IDll
DEFECTS)?

c::J c::J

£XPIRATIOH DATBr

'=

QRIV

BELOW

4.

11q:ss'i'i NO

JF YES., INDICATE
7.

I, HA3 'iOUR DIVVD«J PIUV1LEGS EVER BEllN RBYOKSD, SUSH!'i!DED,

CJ CJ

CANCELED OR DDIZD?

ff.WE YOU BESM COMVICTEO Ol' DR.IYIMG WHJLS Dfl'OXICATSD OR
1.IN'DEa THB L"llFLUDiic&·or DRUCS?

D

CJ

8. O C C U P A T I O : i t • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

IFYES. l:"DiCAT!. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

A5SU)IPTIOM or UABIUTY FOR MINOllS
UNDER EIGHTE'!N YEARS or AGB

(DU.)

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OP UTAH
) SS..
COl>i'iTYOP _ _ _ _ _ I

ITAT! OP UTAH

~U'ltTYOP_~-------

J, THE UNDER51~EO. BEING DULY S"M>RN. STATE THAT I AMTllS
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ OF THE APPLICA."f'? NAMED H!RElJI; THAT I

A;p~HE UND~RSICNl.O,

BEQofO DULY SWOIUI, STATE THAT I A>1 THS
THAT iAHT DESC!UBlD ABOVE: THAT I AM AT LE.\.ST 18 YEARS OF AGE•

TIOlf TH~~~~ C.\RBPULLY READ SAID APPLlCATION A."D THE L'ff0R~~
lbr MY IQ.owu;:."'5MKD BY Al! IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO TH!!: BEST

HAVE READ THB STATElolt!;!llTS HE HAS MAD! IN THIS APPLICATIO!ll MID
THAT THEY ARE TRUE A..~D CORR£CT TO THE BEST07 MY IOIOWl.£008.
I HEREBY CO!\ISENT"TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATION" 1"41POS&D UNDBil s&C.
cone: ,..... SOTA.TED 1953 AS .ulBND!l>. or D~OIOIMTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE APPLICA."'fT FOR A...Y DA>ilo\CD
CAUSED BY HJ~ NEGLIGKSCE OK WILLFUL SUSCONOUCT WHIJ.. K H& IS·
U?'DER THE ACiE OF EJGHTEE:t YEARS WHE:t DRIVDIG A NO'l'OR YBIUCL&
41-2-10, UTAH

X-~~~~~~~-

t SJ GNATUR B or APPLICANT - L" CIKJ

IUMcRnu·:o ANO SWOM TO BEFORH )IS THIS_ DAY OF _ _ _ .._

(:'iOT AltY Pl!BUCJ

.,LO s !P-l:i.!)
T/71

UPO~

A HIGHWAY.

x

(Sl~ATURE

or PAREJrfT OR arHllR
Cl INK)

RESPO:t~U1t.E PERSON -

SUBSCRIBED A."'DSWOR:tTOBBFORB ME THIS-DAY or _ _ _ ,,.__

~AHY

PUBLIC)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated-30OCR, may contain errors.

